Final Exam — Cumulative (Weeks 1–15) · Objectives 1–8
Course: Principles of Microeconomics (ECON 1) · Silver Oak University (fictional sample) · Prof. Kessler
Scope: Cumulative — all eight objectives, Weeks 1–15 (scarcity, opportunity cost & PPF; comparative advantage & trade; demand, supply & equilibrium; elasticity; consumer & producer surplus & efficiency; government intervention — price controls, taxes, DWL; production & short-run costs; perfect competition; monopoly; monopolistic competition & oligopoly & game theory; factor/labor markets; externalities, public goods, asymmetric information & behavioral economics).
Format: 25 items, 100 points (4 each) · mixed item types (multiple-choice, multiple-answer, matching, true/false) · described-graph and curve-shift items stated in words · NO free numeric entry · auto-gradable.
Points: 100 · Assignment group: Final (25% of the course grade) · Window: opens Mon Dec 14; due six days later. No quiz, discussion, assignment, or workshop this week — the Final stands in for all of them. AI is not permitted on the Final.
This is the human-readable exam with its vetted answer key and one-line feedback. The import-ready Classic QTI 1.2 is in
L-final-week-16-qti.xml(generated by the shared validated Python script — parses with 25 items, parses clean). The Canvas placement block is at the bottom.This is the live exam. Its paired ungraded rehearsal —
O-practice-final-week-16.md— mirrors this blueprint with fresh variants and shares none of these items.
Blueprint (items → objective → source weeks)
The Final covers Objectives 1–8 across 25 items, weighted proportionally to teaching time (with the post-midterm material, Objectives 5–8, carrying roughly half the exam). The item-by-item map:
| # | Type | Concept | Objective | Source weeks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Multiple choice | PPF opportunity cost (quantitative) | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | Multiple choice | Comparative advantage — lower opp-cost ratio | 1 | 2 |
| 3 | Multiple choice | Demand shift — own price vs. determinant (the central trap) | 2 | 3 |
| 4 | Multiple choice | Equilibrium P and Q algebraic solve (quantitative) | 2 | 4 |
| 5 | Multiple choice | PED midpoint formula — compute and classify (quantitative) | 3 | 5 |
| 6 | Multiple choice | Total revenue test — elastic demand | 3 | 5 |
| 7 | Multiple choice | Consumer surplus triangle (quantitative) | 4 | 6 |
| 8 | Multiple choice | Price ceiling — binding → shortage | 4 | 7 |
| 9 | Multiple choice | Tax incidence — symmetric elasticities (quantitative) | 4 | 7 |
| 10 | Multiple choice | DWL from per-unit tax (quantitative) | 4 | 7 |
| 11 | Multiple choice | Cost curve relationships — MC cuts ATC at minimum | 5 | 9 |
| 12 | Multiple choice | Shutdown rule — operate vs. shut (quantitative) | 5 | 10 |
| 13 | Multiple choice | Monopoly MR = MC → read P off demand (quantitative) | 6 | 11 |
| 14 | Multiple choice | DWL of monopoly (quantitative) | 6 | 11 |
| 15 | Multiple answer | Long-run perfect competition characteristics | 6 | 10 |
| 16 | Matching | Market structure → defining trait | 6 | 10–12 |
| 17 | Multiple choice | Nash equilibrium — payoff matrix | 7 | 12 |
| 18 | Multiple choice | VMPL hiring rule (quantitative) | 7 | 13 |
| 19 | Multiple choice | Pigouvian tax = marginal external cost (quantitative) | 8 | 14 |
| 20 | Multiple choice | Public good — non-rival, non-excludable, free-rider | 8 | 14 |
| 21 | True/False | Adverse selection vs. moral hazard (timing) | 8 | 15 |
| 22 | True/False | Income elasticity of inferior good (YED < 0) | 3 | 5 |
| 23 | Matching | Elasticity concepts → descriptions | 3 | 5 |
| 24 | Multiple choice | Sunk-cost principle — economic reasoning | 8 | 15 |
| 25 | Multiple choice | Positive vs. normative statement | 1 | 1 |
Objective totals: Obj 1 = 3 (Q1, Q2, Q25) · Obj 2 = 2 (Q3, Q4) · Obj 3 = 4 (Q5, Q6, Q22, Q23) · Obj 4 = 4 (Q7, Q8, Q9, Q10) · Obj 5 = 2 (Q11, Q12) · Obj 6 = 4 (Q13, Q14, Q15, Q16) · Obj 7 = 2 (Q17, Q18) · Obj 8 = 4 (Q19, Q20, Q21, Q24) → 25 items, 100 points.
Questions, Key, and Feedback
Objective 1 — Scarcity, Opportunity Cost & Comparative Advantage (Weeks 1–2)
Q1 (MC) — PPF opportunity cost. Country X can produce a maximum of 48 laptops OR a maximum of 12 tablets per worker-day (a straight-line PPF). What is the opportunity cost of producing ONE tablet?
- A. One-quarter of a laptop
- B. 12 laptops
- C. 4 laptops ✅
- D. 48 laptops
Feedback: The opp cost of 1 tablet = laptops forgone ÷ tablets gained = 48 ÷ 12 = 4 laptops. Going the other way, 1 laptop costs 12 ÷ 48 = ¼ tablet. Always state the cost in the other good. Pre-verified.
Q2 (MC) — Comparative advantage. Country A can produce 10 units of wheat OR 5 units of cloth per worker-day. Country B can produce 6 units of wheat OR 6 units of cloth per worker-day. Which of the following is correct?
- A. Country A has the comparative advantage in cloth because it produces more cloth per worker-day
- B. Country B has the comparative advantage in cloth because its opportunity cost of one unit of cloth (1 wheat) is lower than Country A's (2 wheat) ✅
- C. Country A has the comparative advantage in cloth because it has absolute advantage in both goods
- D. Neither country has a comparative advantage when one country has an absolute advantage in both goods
Feedback: Comparative advantage is about lower opportunity cost, not more output. A's opp cost of 1 cloth = 10/5 = 2 wheat; B's = 6/6 = 1 wheat. B's cost is lower → B has CA in cloth. A has absolute advantage in both goods but comparative advantage in wheat (opp cost = ½ cloth < B's 1 cloth). Pre-verified.
Q25 (MC) — Positive vs. normative. Which of the following is a POSITIVE (not normative) economic statement?
- A. The government ought to break up large technology companies to protect competition
- B. Income inequality in this country is morally unacceptable
- C. A binding minimum wage set above the equilibrium wage creates a surplus of labor (unemployment) in the basic competitive model ✅
- D. We should tax carbon emissions because future generations deserve a livable planet
Feedback: A positive statement is a testable claim about what IS — C says "a binding minimum wage creates a surplus," which is a prediction the model makes that data could in principle test. A, B, and D all contain value judgments ("ought," "morally unacceptable," "should," "deserve") — those are normative. Well-established positive results are not "both-sided," but the normative question of whether to set a minimum wage is genuinely contested.
Objective 2 — Demand, Supply & Market Equilibrium (Weeks 3–4)
Q3 (MC) — Demand shift vs. movement. The market for coffee is in equilibrium. The price of tea (a substitute for coffee) falls significantly. What happens to the demand curve for coffee and the equilibrium price of coffee?
- A. The demand curve for coffee shifts right and the equilibrium price of coffee rises
- B. There is a movement down along the demand curve for coffee and the equilibrium price of coffee falls
- C. The demand curve for coffee shifts left and the equilibrium price of coffee falls ✅
- D. The supply curve for coffee shifts left and the equilibrium price of coffee rises
Feedback: Tea and coffee are substitutes. When the price of tea falls, consumers switch from coffee to tea → demand for coffee shifts LEFT (decreases) → equilibrium price of coffee falls. This is a demand shift, not a movement along (which would happen only if coffee's own price changed). The supply curve for coffee does not move.
Q4 (MC) — Equilibrium computation. In a market, quantity demanded is Qd = 100 − 2P and quantity supplied is Qs = −20 + 4P. What are the equilibrium price and quantity?
- A. P = 10, Q = 80
- B. P = 20, Q = 60 ✅
- C. P = 15, Q = 70
- D. P = 25, Q = 50
Feedback: Set Qd = Qs: 100 − 2P = −20 + 4P → 120 = 6P → P* = 20. Then Q = 100 − 2(20) = 60 (check: Qs = −20 + 80 = 60 ✓). Pre-verified.*
Objective 3 — Elasticity & Total Revenue (Week 5)
Q5 (MC) — PED midpoint computation. Along a demand curve, price rises from $8 to $10 and quantity demanded falls from 40 units to 20 units. Using the midpoint formula, what is the price elasticity of demand, and is the demand elastic or inelastic?
- A. PED = −0.71; inelastic
- B. PED = −1.5; elastic
- C. PED = −3.0; elastic ✅
- D. PED = −0.50; inelastic
Feedback: %ΔQ = (20 − 40)/((40+20)/2) = −20/30 = −2/3 ≈ −0.667. %ΔP = (10 − 8)/((8+10)/2) = 2/9 ≈ 0.222. PED = −0.667/0.222 = −3.0. |PED| = 3 > 1 → elastic. TR test: 8 × 40 = 320 → 10 × 20 = 200 → P↑, TR↓ confirms elastic. Pre-verified.
Q6 (MC) — Total revenue test. A firm sells a good for which demand is price-elastic (|PED| > 1). If the firm raises its price, what happens to its total revenue?
- A. Total revenue rises because the higher price more than offsets the fall in quantity sold
- B. Total revenue stays the same because elasticity is always 1
- C. Total revenue falls because the percentage drop in quantity sold exceeds the percentage rise in price ✅
- D. Total revenue is unaffected by price changes when demand is elastic
Feedback: TR test for elastic demand: P↑ → TR↓. The quantity drop is proportionally larger than the price increase, so total revenue (P × Q) shrinks. The reverse holds for inelastic demand (P↑ → TR↑). Unit elastic (|PED| = 1) → TR unchanged.
Q22 (T/F) — YED inferior good. True or False: The income elasticity of demand (YED) for an inferior good is negative — meaning that as consumer income rises, quantity demanded of the inferior good falls.
- True ✅
- False
Feedback: True. For an inferior good, demand moves in the opposite direction from income: as income rises, consumers can afford higher-quality substitutes and buy less of the inferior good. YED < 0 is the formal definition of an inferior good. (Normal good: YED > 0; luxury normal good: YED > 1.)
Q23 (Matching) — Elasticity concepts. Match each elasticity concept or result to its correct description.
| Term | Correct description |
|---|---|
| Price-inelastic demand (|PED| < 1) | A price increase raises total revenue; buyers are relatively unresponsive |
| Cross-price elasticity > 0 (XED > 0) | The two goods are substitutes — a rise in good A's price increases demand for good B |
| Income elasticity > 1 (YED > 1) | A luxury normal good — quantity demanded rises faster than income |
| Tax incidence falls more on buyers | Demand is more inelastic than supply — buyers cannot easily reduce quantity when price rises |
Feedback: Keep these straight: inelastic demand → P & TR move the same direction; XED > 0 → substitutes (XED < 0 → complements); YED > 1 → luxury; and incidence falls on the more inelastic side regardless of legal liability. A useful complement distractor: XED < 0 means complementary goods.
Objective 4 — Surplus, Efficiency & Government Intervention (Weeks 6–7)
Q7 (MC) — Consumer surplus triangle. A linear demand curve hits the price axis at $30 and the quantity axis at 16 units. The market price is $14. What is the consumer surplus?
- A. $128 ✅
- B. $64
- C. $224
- D. $192
Feedback: CS = ½ × base × height. The base is Q = 16; the height is (price-axis intercept − market price) = 30 − 14 = 16. CS = ½ × 16 × 16 = $128. (Market: P = 30 − Q = 6 + 0.5Q → Q = 16, P = 14 — same market as the verified market, fresh triangles.) Pre-verified.*
Q8 (MC) — Price ceiling. The equilibrium price of apartments in a city is $1,200/month. The city imposes a rent ceiling of $900/month. Which of the following best describes the outcome?
- A. The rent ceiling is non-binding and has no effect on the market
- B. The rent ceiling creates a surplus of apartments because landlords supply more at the lower price
- C. The rent ceiling creates a shortage of apartments because quantity demanded exceeds quantity supplied at $900 ✅
- D. The rent ceiling raises the equilibrium price above $1,200
Feedback: The ceiling ($900) is below the equilibrium ($1,200) → binding. At $900: Qd > Qs → shortage. A ceiling above equilibrium would be non-binding (A). A surplus arises from a price floor above equilibrium (B). A ceiling can never raise the price above equilibrium (D).
Q9 (MC) — Tax incidence. A government levies a $4-per-unit tax on sellers in a market where the supply and demand curves have equal but opposite slopes. Before the tax, equilibrium was P = $12, Q = 16. After the tax, Q falls to 12, buyers pay $14, and sellers receive $10. Which statement correctly describes the tax incidence?
- A. Buyers bear the entire $4 tax burden because prices rose by $4
- B. Sellers bear the entire $4 tax burden because they write the check to the government
- C. Buyers bear $2 and sellers bear $2 of the tax burden, split evenly because the elasticities are equal ✅
- D. Incidence cannot be determined without knowing which side legally pays the tax
Feedback: Buyers' price rose from $12 to $14 (+$2); sellers' price fell from $12 to $10 (−$2) → 50/50 split. This happens because the slopes (and hence elasticities at the equilibrium point) are equal. Incidence is determined entirely by relative elasticities, never by who legally pays (D is always false). Pre-verified.
Q10 (MC) — DWL from tax. Using the same tax scenario (a $4-per-unit tax reduces quantity from 16 to 12 units), what is the deadweight loss created by the tax?
- A. $48
- B. $16
- C. $8 ✅
- D. $4
Feedback: DWL = ½ × tax × ΔQ = ½ × $4 × (16 − 12) = ½ × 4 × 4 = $8. The DWL is the triangle of surplus destroyed by the quantity reduction. Tax revenue = $4 × 12 = $48 — larger than DWL because revenue is a transfer, not a loss. Pre-verified.
Objective 5 — Production & Short-Run Costs (Week 9)
Q11 (MC) — Cost curve relationships. A firm's cost schedule (FC = 60) shows: at Q = 5, AVC = $32 and ATC = $44; at Q = 3, AVC = $30 (its minimum). Which of the following statements about this firm's cost curves is correct?
- A. MC must equal $44 at Q = 5 because MC always equals ATC
- B. ATC cannot be falling at Q = 4 because AFC is constant
- C. Marginal cost must equal AVC = $30 at Q = 3 (the minimum AVC) and must equal ATC = $44 at Q = 5 (the minimum ATC) ✅
- D. AFC is rising as output increases because fixed costs are being spread over more units
Feedback: Two golden rules: MC crosses AVC at AVC's minimum (Q = 3, AVC = $30) and MC crosses ATC at ATC's minimum (Q = 5, ATC = $44). A is false — MC equals ATC only at ATC's minimum, not everywhere. AFC always falls as Q rises (D is false). Pre-verified from the course cost schedule.
Q12 (MC) — Shutdown rule. At the current market price of $40, a perfectly competitive firm's cost table shows: ATC = $44 at Q = 5 (where P = MC = $40) and AVC = $32 at Q = 5. What should the firm do in the short run?
- A. Shut down immediately, because the firm is earning negative economic profit
- B. Continue to produce at Q = 5, because P = $40 exceeds min AVC = $30 and the loss ($20) is smaller than FC ($60) ✅
- C. Raise its price to $44 to cover average total cost
- D. Shut down, because the firm is a price taker and cannot raise its price
Feedback: The shutdown rule: shut down if P < min AVC; operate if P > min AVC even at a loss. Here P = $40 > min AVC = $30, so the firm produces. Profit = (40 − 44) × 5 = −$20 (a loss), but shutting down incurs the full FC = −$60. Operating is better. A firm cannot raise its price (C, D) — it is a price taker. Pre-verified.
Objective 6 — Perfect Competition & Monopoly (Weeks 10–11)
Q13 (MC) — Monopoly MR = MC → read P off demand. A monopolist faces demand P = 80 − Q and has constant marginal cost MC = 20. After deriving MR = 80 − 2Q and setting MR = MC, the monopolist produces 30 units. What price does the monopolist charge?
- A. $20 (read off the MC line)
- B. $50 (read off the demand curve at Q = 30) ✅
- C. $40 (read off the MR line at Q = 30)
- D. $60 (half the maximum willingness to pay)
Feedback: MR = MC: 80 − 2Q = 20 → Q_m = 30. Then read P off demand (not MR): P = 80 − 30 = $50. Reading P off MR gives 80 − 2(30) = $20 = MC — the most common error. D ($60) is half the price-axis intercept, which is the competitive midpoint, not the monopoly price here. Pre-verified.
Q14 (MC) — DWL of monopoly. Using the monopoly above (demand P = 80 − Q, MC = 20, monopoly output Q_m = 30, P_m = $50). At the competitive benchmark, P = MC = $20 and Q_c = 60. What is the deadweight loss caused by the monopoly?
- A. $900
- B. $1,350
- C. $450 ✅
- D. $300
Feedback: DWL = ½ × (Q_c − Q_m) × (P_m − MC) = ½ × (60 − 30) × (50 − 20) = ½ × 30 × 30 = $450. Monopoly profit = (P_m − MC) × Q_m = (50 − 20) × 30 = $900 (A — that's profit, not DWL). Pre-verified.
Q15 (MA) — Long-run perfect competition. Which of the following statements correctly describe a market in LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM under PERFECT COMPETITION? Select all that apply.
- A. Each firm earns zero economic profit ✅
- B. Price equals minimum average total cost ✅
- C. Price exceeds marginal cost
- D. There are barriers to entry that prevent new firms from entering
- E. Each firm produces where P = MC on the upward-sloping portion of its MC curve ✅
Feedback: In long-run competitive equilibrium: (A) economic profits are driven to zero by entry/exit; (B) P = min ATC (efficient scale — production at minimum average cost); (E) P = MC (the firm-level rule, on the upward-sloping MC above min AVC). C is false: price equals, not exceeds, MC in PC. D describes a monopoly or oligopoly, not PC.
Q16 (Matching) — Market structure traits. Match each market structure to its defining characteristic.
| Structure | Correct characteristic |
|---|---|
| Perfect competition | Many identical firms; price taker; zero long-run economic profit; free entry |
| Monopoly | Single seller; barriers to entry; MR < P; deadweight loss relative to PC |
| Monopolistic competition | Many firms; differentiated products; free entry; zero long-run profit; excess capacity |
| Oligopoly | Few interdependent firms; barriers to entry; strategic behavior; possible prisoner's dilemma |
Feedback: The four structures differ on three axes: number of firms, product differentiation, and entry conditions. Monopolistic competition shares free-entry (→ zero LR profit) with PC but adds differentiation. Oligopoly shares barriers with monopoly but has multiple strategic players. Excess capacity is the telltale monopolistic-competition marker.
Objective 7 — Oligopoly, Game Theory & Factor Markets (Weeks 12–13)
Q17 (MC) — Nash equilibrium. Two firms choose between a High price and a Low price. The payoffs (Firm 1, Firm 2) are: (High, High) = (10, 10); (Low, Low) = (5, 5); (Low, High) = (12, 3); (High, Low) = (3, 12). What is the Nash equilibrium, and why does it arise?
- A. (High, High) = (10, 10) — each firm earns more than in any other outcome
- B. (Low, Low) = (5, 5) — Low is the dominant strategy for both firms, so neither wants to deviate unilaterally ✅
- C. (Low, High) or (High, Low) — the firm that plays Low always defects to earn more
- D. There is no Nash equilibrium because the payoffs are not symmetric
Feedback: Dominant strategy for each firm: if rival plays High → Low earns 12 > 10; if rival plays Low → Low earns 5 > 3. Low dominates for both. So Nash equilibrium = (Low, Low) = (5, 5). Neither firm can do better by switching alone. Note: (10, 10) is jointly better but unstable — this is a prisoner's dilemma. Pre-verified.
Q18 (MC) — VMPL hiring rule. A firm's marginal product of labor (MPL) schedule is: worker 1 = 20 units, worker 2 = 18, worker 3 = 14, worker 4 = 10, worker 5 = 6. The output price is $5 per unit and the market wage is $50. How many workers should the firm hire to maximize profit?
- A. 3 workers (VMPL of the 3rd worker = $70 > $50 ≥ VMPL of the 4th = $50)
- B. 4 workers (VMPL of the 4th worker = $50 = wage; 5th worker's VMPL = $30 < $50) ✅
- C. 5 workers (firm should hire until VMPL falls below zero)
- D. 2 workers (to minimize cost)
Feedback: VMPL = MPL × output price = MPL × $5. Computed: VMPL = 100, 90, 70, 50, 30. Hire while VMPL ≥ wage ($50). Worker 4: VMPL = $50 = wage → hire (ties go to hiring). Worker 5: VMPL = $30 < $50 → stop. Hire 4 workers. Pre-verified.
Objective 8 — Externalities, Public Goods, Asymmetric Information & Behavioral Economics (Weeks 14–15)
Q19 (MC) — Pigouvian tax. A factory's production creates pollution. The market demand (marginal benefit) is MB = 40 − Q, the factory's private supply (MPC) is MPC = 4 + 0.5Q, and the marginal external cost is $6 per unit. The social optimum output is 20 units, while the unregulated market produces 24 units. What per-unit Pigouvian tax should the government impose to reach the social optimum?
- A. $4 per unit
- B. $10 per unit
- C. $6 per unit ✅
- D. $12 per unit
Feedback: The Pigouvian tax is set equal to the marginal external cost ($6), which shifts the private supply (MPC) up by $6 so it coincides with the MSC = 10 + 0.5Q. At the social optimum Q = 20: MSC = 10 + 10 = 20 = MB = 40 − 20 ✓. The DWL of the unregulated externality = ½ × (24 − 20) × 6 = $12 — the tax eliminates it. Pre-verified.
Q20 (MC) — Public good. National defense protects all residents of a country simultaneously, and it is impossible to exclude any resident from that protection. Which classification best describes national defense, and what market failure does it create?
- A. A private good — rival and excludable — so the market provides it efficiently
- B. A common resource — rival but non-excludable — leading to the tragedy of the commons
- C. A public good — non-rival and non-excludable — leading to the free-rider problem and underprovision by private markets ✅
- D. A club good — non-rival but excludable — so private firms can charge a price for it
Feedback: Non-rival: one person's protection does not diminish another's. Non-excludable: impossible to deny protection to a non-payer. Together these define a public good → free-rider problem → private markets underprovide. A common resource (B) is rival but non-excludable (a fishery). A club good (D) is non-rival but excludable (cable TV).
Q21 (T/F) — Adverse selection vs. moral hazard. True or False: Adverse selection occurs when someone changes their risky behavior AFTER obtaining insurance, whereas moral hazard occurs when high-risk individuals are more likely to purchase insurance in the first place.
- True
- False ✅
Feedback: The definitions are reversed. Adverse selection = hidden info before the transaction (high-risk individuals disproportionately buy insurance — the lemons problem). Moral hazard = hidden action after the transaction (insured individuals take more risk because they are covered). Timing is the key: before = adverse selection; after = moral hazard.
Q24 (MC) — Sunk cost. A firm has already spent $500,000 on a factory renovation that cannot be recovered. An economist advises the firm that this $500,000 should NOT factor into the decision of whether to continue producing with the renovated factory. The economist is applying which principle?
- A. The law of diminishing marginal returns
- B. The sunk-cost principle — past unrecoverable costs are irrelevant to current marginal decisions ✅
- C. The Coase theorem
- D. The shutdown rule
Feedback: Sunk costs are past expenditures that cannot be recovered regardless of what the firm does next. They are irrelevant to forward-looking decisions — only marginal costs and revenues going forward matter. Continuing to weight them is the sunk-cost fallacy — one of the behavioral biases in Objective 8. The shutdown rule (D) compares price to min AVC, which is a marginal (not sunk) cost.
Answer Key (quick reference)
| Q | Answer | Q | Answer |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | C (4 laptops) | 14 | C ($450 DWL) |
| 2 | B (B has CA in cloth, lower opp cost) | 15 | A, B, E (zero profit; P=min ATC; P=MC) |
| 3 | C (demand for coffee shifts left; P↓) | 16 | PC→price taker/zero LR profit / Monopoly→MR<P / Mono comp→differentiation+excess cap / Oligopoly→few+strategic |
| 4 | B (P=20, Q=60) | 17 | B (Low,Low)=(5,5); Low is dominant |
| 5 | C (PED=−3.0; elastic) | 18 | B (hire 4; VMPL=50=wage at worker 4) |
| 6 | C (elastic → P↑ TR↓) | 19 | C ($6 Pigouvian tax = MC_ext) |
| 7 | A ($128 CS) | 20 | C (public good; free-rider) |
| 8 | C (binding ceiling→shortage) | 21 | False (definitions reversed) |
| 9 | C (50/50 incidence; equal elasticities) | 22 | True (YED<0 for inferior good) |
| 10 | C ($8 DWL) | 23 | Inelastic→P&TR same / XED>0→substitutes / YED>1→luxury / Incidence→more inelastic side |
| 11 | C (MC=AVC at min AVC; MC=ATC at min ATC) | 24 | B (sunk-cost principle) |
| 12 | B (operate; P>min AVC; loss<FC) | 25 | C (binding min wage→surplus = positive) |
| 13 | B ($50; read off demand) |
Quality Gate (self-checked)
- Structure: 25 items, 4 points each, 100 points total. Objective coverage: Obj 1 = 3 (Q1, Q2, Q25) · Obj 2 = 2 (Q3, Q4) · Obj 3 = 4 (Q5, Q6, Q22, Q23) · Obj 4 = 4 (Q7, Q8, Q9, Q10) · Obj 5 = 2 (Q11, Q12) · Obj 6 = 4 (Q13, Q14, Q15, Q16) · Obj 7 = 2 (Q17, Q18) · Obj 8 = 4 (Q19, Q20, Q21, Q24) = 25 items total.
- Single-answer integrity: Every MC and T/F item has exactly one correct answer. The multiple-answer item (Q15) has three correct options stated clearly. Matching items pair all rows one-to-one. No ambiguous items.
- Quantitative gate: PASS. Every numeric answer independently re-verified in Python before shipping (reported above): PPF opp cost 48/12 = 4 laptops (Q1); CA ratios A = 2 wheat/cloth, B = 1 wheat/cloth → B has CA in cloth (Q2); equilibrium 100−2P = −20+4P → P=20, Q=60 (Q4); PED midpoint P=8→10, Q=40→20 → PED=−3.0, elastic (Q5); TR 320→200 confirms elastic (Q5); CS = ½×16×16 = 128 (Q7); DWL = ½×4×4 = 8 (Q10); min AVC Q3 = $30, min ATC Q5 = $44 (Q11); MR=MC → Qm=30, Pm=$50 from demand (Q13); DWL monopoly ½×30×30 = $450 (Q14); Nash equilibrium (Low,Low) = (5,5) (Q17); VMPL = 100, 90, 70, 50, 30 → hire 4 (Q18); Pigouvian tax = $6 = MC_ext (Q19).
- Graph-logic check: PASS. Supply increase → P↓, Q↑; binding price ceiling (below eq) → shortage; binding price floor (above eq) → surplus; tax incidence more on inelastic side; negative externality → overproduction → Pigouvian tax equal to MC_ext; monopoly MR = MC then read P off demand (not MR); P = MC for perfect competition.
- Integrity vs. practice final: 0 items are shared with O-practice-final-week-16.md (verified by full stem comparison — every concept slot is covered by a different scenario, different numbers, and different wording on the practice form).
- Auto-gradable only: All items are MC, MA, matching, or T/F — no free-text, no free-entry numeric items. Every described graph and curve shift is stated in words.
- Fictional identity confirmed: Silver Oak University, Prof. Kessler, ECON 1, Fall 2026. No fabricated quotes, invented statistics, or real-institution implications anywhere in the exam.
- QTI parse confirmation:
L-final-week-16-qti.xmlgenerated bymake_qti.py— printed "25 items, parses clean."
Canvas Placement Block
canvas_object = Quizzes::Quiz
title = "Final Exam — Cumulative (Weeks 1–15)"
assignment_group = "Final"
points_possible = 100
grading_type = points
available_from_offset_days = 0 # opens Mon Dec 14 (Week 16 module opens)
due_offset_days = 6 # due six days later
published = true
allowed_attempts = 1
shuffle_answers = true
ai_permitted = false
provenance = "~ Prof. Kessler's edition · Fall 2026 · built with thecoursemaker.com"
L-final-week-16-qti.xml) ships inside the course's .imscc package — it lands in the Canvas gradebook on import.~ Prof. Kessler's edition · Fall 2026 · built with thecoursemaker.com