Week 13 · Chapter

Chapter 13 — Political Philosophy: The State, Justice, and Liberty

Introduction to Philosophy Free sample edition

The module's primary reading · ~45–55 minutes · Objective 7 (compare social contract theories and theories of justice and liberty, from Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau to Mill, Rawls, and Nozick), with Objective 6 (explain and apply the major ethical theories — utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, virtue ethics, and social contract theory — and the challenges of relativism and egoism, to moral cases) and Objective 2 (identify arguments, put them in standard form, judge whether they are valid, sound, or inductively strong, and test claims with counterexamples and thought experiments) carried forward · Read it first this week; the lecture, the slide deck, the tutorial, the quiz, and the Philosophy Workshop all build on it.

In plain language

This week asks two old questions: what gives a government the right to rule, and what do we owe one another? A right to rule is called legitimacy (rightful authority, as opposed to mere power). One family of answers, social contract theory (the view that fair rules come from what free, reasonable people would agree to), says the right to rule comes from us. You meet four versions of that idea and two thinkers who set limits on what any government may do. Your goal is to state each account as its best defenders would and to weigh the objections fairly, not to pick a winner or to settle any question in today's politics.

Why you already care about this

A storm strands a group of strangers in a mountain lodge for a week. There is no phone signal and no one in charge. The firewood and the food will not last unless someone shares them out. By the second night, guests are arguing over the last blankets. Then someone stands up and says, "We need rules, and someone to enforce them."

You have seen smaller versions of that moment. A group project needs someone to set deadlines. Roommates need a rule about the kitchen. A club needs to decide who can spend its money. Each time, someone asks a hard question: who gave you the right to tell me what to do?

That question has a long history. In 1651 Thomas Hobbes published Leviathan, which imagines life with no government at all. In 1859 John Stuart Mill published On Liberty, which asks when power over a person is ever rightful. In 1971 John Rawls asked what rules you would choose if you did not know your place in society. This chapter walks through all of them.

By the end of this chapter you will be able to:

define legitimacy and social contract theory, and state social contract theory in its strongest form;
quote Hobbes's sentence on the life of man and Mill's harm principle exactly as the course pins them;
explain why the state of nature is a thought experiment, not a historical era;
compare Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls on where the agreement starts and what government it yields;
apply the harm principle to a fresh case and explain why it does not forbid all limits on liberty;
put Dataset B's argument 5 in standard form, key it invalid, and give a counterexample;
run the veil of ignorance on a town budget and state Rawls's 2 principles;
state Nozick's entitlement theory and the objections that pass between Rawls and Nozick, each with a reply.

Carry this line with you: a right to rule, not only the power to rule.

Where we are

Already covered: Week 1, What Philosophy Is, named political philosophy as a branch. Week 2, Arguments and Thought Experiments, gave you standard form, validity, and the invalid pattern every A is B; this C is B; so this C is A. Week 10 asked whether morality is relative or rests on self-interest. Week 11 met utilitarianism, and Week 12, Ethics III: Kant, Virtue, and the Trolley Problem, met Kantian deontology and virtue ethics.
This week: social contract theory and legitimacy; Hobbes's state of nature and sovereign; Locke's natural rights and consent; Rousseau's general will; Mill's harm principle; Rawls's veil of ignorance and his 2 principles; and Nozick's entitlement theory, minimal state, and experience machine.
How they connect: Weeks 11 and 12 asked what makes an act right. This week asks what makes a government's rules rightful, and it brings in the last of Dataset D's 4 theories.
Where we're going next: Week 14, Philosophy Beyond Europe, sets Confucian, Daoist, Buddhist, and ubuntu philosophy beside the European theories, asking what each adds without ranking any of them.

Two tools from earlier weeks do the heavy lifting. From Week 2, you need standard form: premises numbered P1 and P2, the conclusion last, marked C and introduced by "So". You need valid (the conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true) and invalid (the conclusion could be false even if the premises are true). You also need the idea of a counterexample: one case where the premises are true and the conclusion is false. From Week 11, you need Bentham's claim that pain and pleasure are the measure of what goes well or badly for us. It returns at the end of this chapter.

1. Name the question: legitimacy and the social contract

Think about two people who both demand your wallet. One is a mugger with a knife. The other is a tax office with a lawful bill. Both have power over you. Most people feel that only one of them has a right to ask. What is the difference?

That difference has a name, and so does one famous way of explaining it.

Legitimacy — a government's rightful authority to make rules and enforce them, as opposed to mere power to force people to obey.
Social contract theory — the view that legitimate rules and authority come from what free, rational people would agree to for living together; it puts agreement first.

Dataset D, the four ethical theories, gives social contract theory its row. It is the last of the 4, after utilitarianism in Week 11 and Kantian deontology and virtue ethics in Week 12.

Dataset D, social contract theory's row: its central question, key sources, and what it puts first
Theory	Its central question	Key sources	Puts first
Social contract theory	What rules would rational people agree to for living together?	Hobbes (1651); Rousseau (1762)	agreement

Worked example — counting Dataset D. Weeks 11 and 12 met 3 of Dataset D's theories. This week adds 1 more. So 3 + 1 = 4, and the set is complete.

Here is the theory in its strongest form. No one is born with a right to rule anyone else. So if anyone may make rules for all of us, the right must come from us. It must come from what each of us, free and reasoning well, would accept. The theory's strongest appeal is that it explains two things at once: why we owe obedience at all, and why some governments do not deserve it.

In one plain sentence: social contract theory says a government's right to rule comes from the agreement of the people it rules, actual or reasonable.

Misconception check — a "contract" here is not a signed piece of paper. Students often think social contract theory claims that people once signed an actual agreement. It is tempting because the word "contract" suggests a document. The cure is to read the theory's question: what rules would rational people agree to? Some versions point to real consent, and others to what people would reasonably accept. Either way, the agreement is a test for rules, not a page in an archive.

2. Meet Hobbes: the war of every one against every one

Go back to the lodge. Imagine the storm never ends and no one ever takes charge. Each guest guards a share of food. Each sleeps lightly. Anyone could take your blanket while you sleep, and you could take theirs. No one can plan for tomorrow, because no one can trust anyone.

Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan (1651), asked what life would be like with no government at all.

State of nature — life imagined with no government at all, used as a thought experiment to show why government is worth having and what it must secure; it is not a historical era.

Hobbes describes the state of nature as a war of every one against every one. In Chapter XIII, he ends his list of what such a life would lack with this sentence, in his own English (the English original, so no translator is named):

"And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."

The spelling "poore" is Hobbes's own. The course keeps it, because a quotation is copied exactly as its text prints it.

How do people escape? They agree to hand their power to one ruler.

Sovereign — the person or assembly that holds supreme authority in a state; in Hobbes's Leviathan the sovereign's power is absolute.

Here is Hobbes's case in its strongest form. People are roughly equal, so even the strongest person can be killed by the weak while asleep. Goods are scarce. With no common power to keep the peace, each person has reason to strike first. So rational people agree to give their power to one sovereign. That sovereign's rule, however harsh, is better than the war.

Worked example — Dataset J, statement 7. Dataset J, the theory-matching set (illustrative), pairs short statements with the theories they express. Its premises were written for teaching, and the course does not endorse them.

The statement: "Moral rules are the terms rational people would accept so that everyone is better off than in a war of all against all."
What it says: the rules we live by are an agreement, and the agreement is worth making because the alternative is Hobbes's war.
Which theory says that: social contract theory. Key: social contract theory.

Dataset H, the social contract set, gives Hobbes his row.

Dataset H, Hobbes's row: the starting situation, what the agreement secures, and the government it yields
Theorist	Starting situation	What the agreement secures	Government
Hobbes (1651)	A state of nature that is a war of every one against every one	Peace and security	An absolute sovereign

Now the strongest objection. An absolute sovereign can become a tyrant. A state that makes war on its own people might be as bad as the war of every one against every one. Reply, from Hobbes's side: any sovereign that keeps the peace is better than the war, and a power split between rivals invites the war back.

In one plain sentence: Hobbes argues that rational people would give an absolute sovereign their power to escape the war of every one against every one, and critics answer that an unchecked sovereign can be its own kind of war.

Misconception check — the state of nature is not a historical era. Students often think Hobbes is describing a real time, long ago, before governments existed. It is tempting because he writes about it as a "state" people could be in. The cure is to ask what the idea is for. The state of nature is a thought experiment about life with no government, used to show why government is worth having. Its point holds whether or not such a time ever existed.

3. Meet Locke: natural rights and consent

Picture a hiking trail with no ranger and no posted rules. Most hikers still do not shove one another off the path or steal one another's water. They seem to know that some things are wrong before anyone writes a rule. A ranger, if one arrives, is there to protect what was already owed.

John Locke built a theory on that thought. His Second Treatise, in Two Treatises of Government, has a title page dated 1690. The course names that date but never keys it.

Natural rights — rights a person has before and apart from any government, which in Locke's Second Treatise are the rights to life, liberty, and property.
Consent — a person's agreement to be governed, which in Locke's account is what makes a government's authority legitimate.

For Locke, people in the state of nature already have natural rights. What they lack is a fair, settled way to protect them. So they agree to set up a government. Its job is to protect those rights, it rests on their consent, and its power is limited.

Dataset H, Locke's row: the starting situation, what the agreement secures, and the government it yields
Theorist	Starting situation	What the agreement secures	Government
Locke (title page 1690)	A state of nature with natural rights to life, liberty, and property	The protection of those rights	Limited government by consent

Worked example — Locke on the timeline. Leviathan appeared in 1651, and Locke's title page is dated 1690. The gap: 1690 − 1651 = 39 years. In words: Locke's title page came 39 years after Leviathan, and Locke started from a far less grim picture of life without government.

Now press Locke.

Consent objection — the objection to consent theories of government that most people alive now never agreed to their government, so the consent the theory needs seems to be a fiction.

Most people were born into a country and never signed or said yes to anything. Reply, from the consent theorist's side: a person can consent without words, by staying, accepting the government's protection, and using what it provides. And a government that could not win the consent of free, reasonable people has no claim to rule them at all.

In one plain sentence: Locke grounds government in the consent of people who already have natural rights, and the consent objection asks whether most of us ever gave that consent.

Misconception check — "limited government" does not mean "no rules". Students often think Locke's limited government is barely a government. It is tempting because Locke stresses what government may not do. The cure is to read his row again. Government protects life, liberty, and property, and that takes laws, judges, and enforcement. What limits it is its purpose: power used beyond that purpose loses its claim.

4. Meet Rousseau: the general will

Think about a choir. Each singer has a voice of their own. When the choir sings well, no one is drowned out and no one is forced. Each voice becomes part of something shared, and each singer still sings freely.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in The Social Contract (1762), pictured a political community something like that. Each person gives themselves to the community as a whole. In return, each becomes a member of a body that rules itself.

General will — in Rousseau's The Social Contract, the will of the people as a whole aimed at the common good, from which legitimate authority comes; it is not the same as whatever most people happen to want.

For Rousseau, freedom comes through the general will. A person who obeys a law aimed at the common good, a law they share in making, is obeying themselves.

Dataset H, Rousseau's row: the starting situation, what the agreement secures, and the government it yields
Theorist	Starting situation	What the agreement secures	Government
Rousseau (1762)	People who give themselves to the community as a whole	Freedom through the general will	Authority grounded in the general will

Worked example — Rousseau on the timeline. Locke's title page is dated 1690, and The Social Contract appeared in 1762. The gap: 1762 − 1690 = 72 years. In words: Rousseau wrote 72 years after Locke's title page, and 1762 is the date the course keys.

Now press Rousseau.

Dissenter objection — the objection to Rousseau's account that a citizen outvoted on a law seems to be ruled by the majority's will rather than their own, so the general will may be a mask for majority rule.

Reply, from Rousseau's side: the general will is not whatever most people want. It is the will for the common good of each and all. A citizen bound by laws aimed at that good obeys a rule they share in making, even when they lost the vote.

In one plain sentence: Rousseau grounds authority in the general will, and the dissenter objection asks whether an outvoted citizen is truly free.

Misconception check — the general will is not the same as a majority vote. Students often think "the general will" is a fancy name for whatever wins. It is tempting because voting is how groups often decide. The cure is the definition. The general will aims at the common good, and a majority can be wrong about that good. A vote is, at best, a way to look for the general will.

5. Meet Mill: the harm principle

Imagine a neighbor who spends every weekend skydiving. You think it is reckless. You might worry, warn, or argue with your neighbor. But should a law stop them? Now imagine a different neighbor who sets off fireworks over your roof. That seems like a different kind of case.

John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty (1859), drew a line between those cases. In Chapter I he states the harm principle, in his own English:

"That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."

The spelling "civilised" is Mill's own, and the course keeps it.

Harm principle — John Stuart Mill's principle in On Liberty that the only purpose for which power may rightfully be used over a member of a civilised community, against their will, is to prevent harm to others.
Paternalism — limiting a person's liberty for that person's own good, which the harm principle rules out as a reason for using power over someone.

Mill's principle is not a theory of where government comes from. It is a limit on what any government may do. Dataset H's accounts say where authority starts; Mill says where it stops.

Worked example — the harm principle at a town meeting. A town meeting debates two proposed rules for its narrow riverside path.

Rule one bans cycling at speed on the path where people walk. It prevents harm to others, the walkers. The harm principle permits it.
Rule two requires every walker to wear a sun hat for their own protection. It limits walkers only for their own good. That is paternalism, and the harm principle rules it out.
So the principle permits one limit and forbids the other. It does not forbid all limits on liberty.

Worked example — Mill on the timeline. The Social Contract appeared in 1762, and On Liberty in 1859. The gap: 1859 − 1762 = 97 years.

Now the strongest objection. Almost any act can harm someone somehow, so "harm to others" may permit too much. Reply, from Mill's side: harm means a setback to another person's interests, not mere dislike or offense. And the principle still forbids every limit that protects a person only from themselves.

In one plain sentence: the harm principle allows power over a person only to prevent harm to others, so it forbids paternalism but permits limits that protect other people.

Misconception check — the harm principle does not forbid all limits on liberty. Students often think Mill says a government may never restrict anyone. It is tempting because On Liberty is famous for defending freedom. The cure is the riverside path. The principle permits the cycling rule, which prevents harm to others. What it forbids is using power over a person for that person's own good.

6. Test an argument about laws

Here is an argument from Dataset B, the argument set (illustrative). Its premises were written for teaching, and the course does not endorse them.

Worked example — Dataset B, argument 5, in standard form. Lay the argument out line by line, then judge it.

P1: All just laws protect the vulnerable.

P2: This law protects the vulnerable.

C: So this law is just.

Name the pattern. Let A be "just law", B be "something that protects the vulnerable", and C be "this law". The pattern is every A is B; this C is B; so this C is A. That is the invalid pattern from Week 2. Key it: invalid. The conclusion could be false with true premises, because an unjust law could also protect the vulnerable.

Here is a counterexample, written for this course. Picture a law that protects children on a playground and also bans one group of parents from the park. It protects the vulnerable, so P2 is true of it. Yet it is unjust, so C is false of it. If P1 is true too, the premises hold while the conclusion fails.

In one plain sentence: argument 5 is invalid, because protecting the vulnerable is something just laws do, not something only just laws do.

Misconception check — an invalid argument can still have a true conclusion. Students often think that once argument 5 is shown invalid, the law in question must be unjust. It is tempting because "invalid" sounds like "false". The cure is Week 2's two questions. Invalid means the premises do not guarantee the conclusion. A particular law might still be just, for other reasons; this argument does not show it.

7. Step behind the veil of ignorance

Two friends must share the last slice of a cake. One friend cuts, and the other chooses first. Now the cutter has every reason to cut evenly, because the cutter does not know which piece will be left.

John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice (1971), built a theory of justice on a thought like that one. It is the Week 13 case on the course's thought-experiment roster.

Original position — John Rawls's imagined situation in which people choose the principles of justice for their society together, before knowing their own place in it.
Veil of ignorance — the device in Rawls's original position that hides from each chooser the facts about their own place in society, such as wealth, talents, and what they most value, while leaving general knowledge about how societies work.

The roster gives the case a question: What rules would you choose if you did not know your place? It tests justice and the social contract.

Rawls argues that the choosers would pick 2 principles.

Equal basic liberties — Rawls's first principle of justice: each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible with the same liberties for everyone, and Rawls ranks it ahead of his second principle.
Difference principle — Rawls's principle that social and economic inequalities are allowed only when they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.

Dataset H, Rawls's row: the starting situation, what the agreement secures, and the government it yields
Theorist	Starting situation	What the agreement secures	Government
Rawls (1971)	An original position behind a veil of ignorance	Equal basic liberties and the difference principle	Just institutions

Worked example — the veil on a town budget. A town meeting must decide how to share out its budget among its neighborhoods. Everyone is asked to vote as if they did not know which neighborhood they lived in.

Plan A gives every neighborhood an equal share.
Plan B gives some neighborhoods more than others, and leaves the worst-off neighborhood better off than under Plan A.
Plan C gives the best-off neighborhoods far more, and leaves the worst-off neighborhood worse off than under Plan A.
The difference principle permits Plan B's inequality, because it works to the benefit of the worst-off. It rules out Plan C's.

Worked example — Dataset J, statement 8. The statement (illustrative): "Choose principles of justice as if you did not know whether you would be rich or poor." It asks you to choose from behind the veil. Key: social contract theory.

Worked example — Rawls on the timeline. On Liberty appeared in 1859, and A Theory of Justice in 1971. The gap: 1971 − 1859 = 112 years.

Now the strongest objection. A chooser who likes to gamble might pick Plan C, hoping to land among the best-off. Reply, from Rawls's side: the stakes are a whole life, for you and for those who come after you. So a reasonable chooser secures the worst position first.

Pause and think, choosing one of these two options:

(a) Describe a rule at your work or school that you would keep if you did not know which role you would hold there, and write two sentences on why.
(b) Describe a rule you would change if you might end up in the worst-placed role, and write two sentences on what you would choose instead.

In one plain sentence: the veil of ignorance asks what rules you would choose without knowing your place, and Rawls argues you would choose equal basic liberties and the difference principle.

Misconception check — the veil of ignorance does not hide everything. Students often think the choosers know nothing at all. It is tempting because "ignorance" sounds total. The cure is to ask what the veil hides. It hides facts about you: your wealth, your talents, what you most value. It leaves general knowledge about how societies and economies work, because the choosers need it to choose well.

8. Meet Nozick: entitlement and the experience machine

Imagine you grow tomatoes in a garden plot no one else wanted. You trade some tomatoes to a neighbor for a lamp. Later, someone proposes taking your lamp to make the neighborhood's holdings more equal. You might protest: "I came by this fairly. Who could have a right to take it?"

Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974, a date the course names but never keys), gave that protest a theory.

Entitlement theory — Robert Nozick's theory that a person's holdings are just if they were acquired justly, or transferred justly from someone who held them justly, with any injustice in that history corrected.
Minimal state — a state limited to protecting people against force, theft, and fraud and to enforcing contracts, which Robert Nozick defends in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.

The entitlement theory looks at history: how did each holding come to be where it is? Rawls's difference principle looks at a pattern: does the way things are shared out help the least advantaged? That contrast drives the debate between them.

Entitlement objection — the objection to Rawls's difference principle that, if holdings were acquired and transferred justly, taking some of them to fit a pattern takes what people are entitled to.

Reply, from Rawls's side: no one deserves the talents they were born with or the family they were born into. And a society's basic institutions shape what anyone holds in the first place, so those institutions must be just before any holding is.

Now press Nozick.

History objection — the objection to Nozick's entitlement theory that many holdings today trace back through a history that includes force and theft, so few holdings may be fully just.

Reply, from Nozick's side: that is why the theory includes correcting past injustice. The objection asks for that correction, not for a pattern.

Nozick's book also holds a famous thought experiment.

The experience machine — Robert Nozick's thought experiment of a machine that could give you any experiences you wanted for the rest of your life while you believed them real, used to question whether pleasure is all that matters.

Imagine floating in a tank, plugged in, sure it is all real. Would you plug in? If you would refuse, the refusal suggests that something besides pleasant experience matters to you, such as actually doing things and being in touch with what is real. That presses Week 11's starting point, Bentham's claim that pain and pleasure are our two sovereign masters.

Worked example — Nozick on the timeline. A Theory of Justice appeared in 1971, and Anarchy, State, and Utopia in 1974. The gap: 1974 − 1971 = 3 years. In words: the two books appeared 3 years apart.

In one plain sentence: Nozick's entitlement theory judges holdings by their history and defends a minimal state, while the difference principle judges them by a pattern, and each side has an objection and a reply.

Misconception check — Nozick is not arguing against all government. Students often think a defender of the minimal state wants no state at all. It is tempting because the book's title begins with "Anarchy". The cure is the definition. The minimal state protects people against force, theft, and fraud and enforces contracts. Nozick defends that state, not its absence.

9. Weigh the accounts side by side

You now have 4 accounts of where a government's authority comes from and 2 limits on what it may do. The fair way to compare them is the course's way: each view in its strongest form, its strongest objection, and a reply from its own side.

Dataset H's four social contract accounts compared on starting situation, what the agreement secures, and the government it yields
Theorist	Starting situation	What the agreement secures	Government
Hobbes (1651)	A state of nature that is a war of every one against every one	Peace and security	An absolute sovereign
Locke (title page 1690)	A state of nature with natural rights to life, liberty, and property	The protection of those rights	Limited government by consent
Rousseau (1762)	People who give themselves to the community as a whole	Freedom through the general will	Authority grounded in the general will
Rawls (1971)	An original position behind a veil of ignorance	Equal basic liberties and the difference principle	Just institutions

Mill's harm principle (1859) and Nozick's entitlement theory (1974) are the limits on state power the course compares with these.

Worked example — the timeline and the tallies. Line up the week's dated works, then count.

1690 − 1651 = 39; 1762 − 1690 = 72; 1859 − 1762 = 97; 1971 − 1859 = 112; 1974 − 1971 = 3.
From Leviathan to A Theory of Justice: 1971 − 1651 = 320 years.
Views this week: Dataset H's 4 accounts plus Mill's and Nozick's 2 limits, so 4 + 2 = 6.
Dataset J: 6 statements were keyed in Weeks 11 and 12, and this week keys statements 7 and 8, so 6 + 2 = 8, all of them.
Dataset C: Q9 and Q10 are the last 2 of its 10 quotations, so 10 − 2 = 8 came earlier.

In words: the week's sources span 320 years, from Hobbes to Rawls, and this week completes both Dataset J and Dataset C.

Here is where the accounts sit, from the most power to the least. Hobbes's government is the strongest, an absolute sovereign. Locke's and Rawls's are limited by rights and liberties. Rousseau's rests on the general will. Mill limits every government by the harm principle. Nozick's minimal state is the smallest.

Where do they disagree, in one plain sentence? They agree that a government's authority must be justified to the people it rules, and they disagree about where the agreement starts, how much power it hands over, and whether justice looks at a pattern or at a history.

Here is an honesty note. Each objection and each reply this week is still argued over. The course keys no verdict on which political theory is correct, and it argues no current policy question. Your job is to state each view so well that its own defenders would sign it.

A limitation to keep in view: each thinker here wrote far more than one section can carry, so treat these as fair summaries, not the whole of any book.

Misconception check — comparing theories is not choosing a side in today's politics. Students often think that studying Hobbes or Nozick means signing up for a modern party. It is tempting because some of the same words, such as liberty and equality, appear in the news. The cure is the course's method. These are arguments about legitimacy and justice, each stated in its strongest form, and you test them as arguments.

Key terms

Legitimacy — A government's rightful authority to make rules and enforce them, as opposed to mere power to force people to obey. (first used: 1. Name the question: legitimacy and the social contract)
Social contract theory — The view that legitimate rules and authority come from what free, rational people would agree to for living together; it puts agreement first. (first used: 1. Name the question: legitimacy and the social contract)
State of nature — Life imagined with no government at all, used as a thought experiment to show why government is worth having and what it must secure; it is not a historical era. (first used: 2. Meet Hobbes: the war of every one against every one)
Sovereign — The person or assembly that holds supreme authority in a state; in Hobbes's Leviathan the sovereign's power is absolute. (first used: 2. Meet Hobbes: the war of every one against every one)
Natural rights — Rights a person has before and apart from any government, which in Locke's Second Treatise are the rights to life, liberty, and property. (first used: 3. Meet Locke: natural rights and consent)
Consent — A person's agreement to be governed, which in Locke's account is what makes a government's authority legitimate. (first used: 3. Meet Locke: natural rights and consent)
Consent objection — The objection to consent theories of government that most people alive now never agreed to their government, so the consent the theory needs seems to be a fiction. (first used: 3. Meet Locke: natural rights and consent)
General will — In Rousseau's The Social Contract, the will of the people as a whole aimed at the common good, from which legitimate authority comes; it is not the same as whatever most people happen to want. (first used: 4. Meet Rousseau: the general will)
Dissenter objection — The objection to Rousseau's account that a citizen outvoted on a law seems to be ruled by the majority's will rather than their own, so the general will may be a mask for majority rule. (first used: 4. Meet Rousseau: the general will)
Harm principle — John Stuart Mill's principle in On Liberty that the only purpose for which power may rightfully be used over a member of a civilised community, against their will, is to prevent harm to others. (first used: 5. Meet Mill: the harm principle)
Paternalism — Limiting a person's liberty for that person's own good, which the harm principle rules out as a reason for using power over someone. (first used: 5. Meet Mill: the harm principle)
Original position — John Rawls's imagined situation in which people choose the principles of justice for their society together, before knowing their own place in it. (first used: 7. Step behind the veil of ignorance)
Veil of ignorance — The device in Rawls's original position that hides from each chooser the facts about their own place in society, such as wealth, talents, and what they most value, while leaving general knowledge about how societies work. (first used: 7. Step behind the veil of ignorance)
Equal basic liberties — Rawls's first principle of justice: each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible with the same liberties for everyone, and Rawls ranks it ahead of his second principle. (first used: 7. Step behind the veil of ignorance)
Difference principle — Rawls's principle that social and economic inequalities are allowed only when they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. (first used: 7. Step behind the veil of ignorance)
Entitlement theory — Robert Nozick's theory that a person's holdings are just if they were acquired justly, or transferred justly from someone who held them justly, with any injustice in that history corrected. (first used: 8. Meet Nozick: entitlement and the experience machine)
Minimal state — A state limited to protecting people against force, theft, and fraud and to enforcing contracts, which Robert Nozick defends in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. (first used: 8. Meet Nozick: entitlement and the experience machine)
Entitlement objection — The objection to Rawls's difference principle that, if holdings were acquired and transferred justly, taking some of them to fit a pattern takes what people are entitled to. (first used: 8. Meet Nozick: entitlement and the experience machine)
History objection — The objection to Nozick's entitlement theory that many holdings today trace back through a history that includes force and theft, so few holdings may be fully just. (first used: 8. Meet Nozick: entitlement and the experience machine)
The experience machine — Robert Nozick's thought experiment of a machine that could give you any experiences you wanted for the rest of your life while you believed them real, used to question whether pleasure is all that matters. (first used: 8. Meet Nozick: entitlement and the experience machine)

Summary

Legitimacy is the right to rule, not the mere power to rule.
Social contract theory grounds that right in what free, rational people would agree to.
Hobbes's Leviathan (1651) pictures a war of every one against every one and an absolute sovereign.
The state of nature is a thought experiment, not a historical era.
Locke grounds limited government in consent and natural rights to life, liberty, and property.
Rousseau's The Social Contract (1762) grounds authority in the general will, which is not a mere majority.
Mill's harm principle (On Liberty, 1859) forbids paternalism but permits limits that prevent harm to others.
Dataset B's argument 5 is invalid: an unjust law could also protect the vulnerable.
Rawls's veil of ignorance (1971) hides facts about yourself, not general knowledge.
Rawls's 2 principles: equal basic liberties first, then the difference principle.
Nozick's entitlement theory judges holdings by their history and defends a minimal state.
No political theory is keyed as correct, and no current policy question is argued.

Check your understanding

Work these before looking at the answers — they are ungraded, and the answers (with reasoning) are at the bottom of the page.

Sort each claim under the thinker it best fits: (a) "People already have rights before any government, and government exists to protect them." (b) "Any ruler who keeps the peace is better than life with no ruler at all." (c) "Choose the rules before you learn which role you will have."
A library board proposes two rules: one bans shouting in the reading room, and one bans checking out more than one book on a risky hobby, for the reader's own safety. Say which rule the harm principle permits and which it rules out, and why.
A student writes: "All fair rules are written down. This rule is written down. So this rule is fair." Put the argument in standard form, name its pattern, and say whether it is valid.
A classmate says, "The veil of ignorance means you forget everything, even how money works." Explain the mistake in two or three sentences.

Answers (worked reasoning — read after attempting)

(a) Locke: natural rights to life, liberty, and property come first, and government protects them. (b) Hobbes: an absolute sovereign is better than the war of every one against every one. (c) Rawls: choosing from behind the veil of ignorance, without knowing your place.
The shouting rule prevents harm to others, the other readers, so the harm principle permits it. The book rule limits a reader only for their own good, which is paternalism, so the harm principle rules it out. The principle does not forbid all limits; it forbids limits for a person's own good.
P1: All fair rules are written down. P2: This rule is written down. C: So this rule is fair. Let A be "fair rule", B be "something written down", and C be "this rule". The pattern is every A is B; this C is B; so this C is A. That pattern is invalid: an unfair rule could also be written down, so the premises could be true while the conclusion is false.
The veil hides facts about the chooser: wealth, talents, and what they most value. It leaves general knowledge, such as how money and markets work, because the choosers need that knowledge to pick good rules. Ignorance of everything would leave nothing to choose with.

Next up in this module: the Readings & Resources page, the lecture tutorial, the practice set, the quiz, the discussion, and the assignment. Next week, the course's method of fair comparison meets Confucian, Daoist, Buddhist, and ubuntu philosophy, each with its own account of persons and relationships.

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